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reasonable nexus to matters within the SEC's jurisdiction under
other provisions [of the Holding Company Act]. "118
Therefore, the interpretation given to matters which the SEC
must investigate in the "public interest" when considering an au-
thorization to issue securities is congruent with the interpretation
given the phrase in the FPC's domain. Accordingly, it does not
appear that the securities of holding companies will have any great
advantage, if any advantage at all, over the securities of operating
companies. What does seem to follow from the decision in Gulf
States Utilities is that public utilities (and holding companies) will
be more reticent about contravening the antitrust laws since it may
jeopardize their ability to raise necessary capital.
CONCLUSION
In summary, it is submitted that the Federal Power Commis-
sion took an antiquated view of its responsibilities when it ruled that
the Cities' antitrust claims were irrelevant under a section 204
proceeding. When the Cities alleged that Gulf States was engaging
in anticompetitive conduct, the FPC should have reconsidered its
1962 decision in Pacific Power & Light and should have brought
itself in line with the Supreme Court's decisions affecting other
administrative agencies dealing with similar matters. Thus, the de-
cision in Gulf States Utilities brings the FPC up to date and estab-
lishes a standard for section 204 proceedings which is in conformity
with the current conception of the "public interest."
LARRY E. BERGMANN
Labor Law—Antitrust Liability of Labor Unions—Connell Con-
struction Co. v. Plumbers Local 100. 1 —Plaintiff, Connell Construc-
tion Co. (Connell), a general contractor in the construction industry
in Texas, initially instituted this suit against defendant, Plumbers
Local 100 (the Union), in Texas state court, alleging that picketing
by the Union of Connell's construction project for the purpose of
forcing Connell to sign an agreement not to employ nonunion sub-
contractors violated the antitrust laws of Texas. 2
 The Union re-
11 ° Id. at 956.
483 F.2d 1154, 84 L.R.R.M. 2001 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3631
(U.S. May 14, 1974).
2
 Tex. Code Ann. !Pi 15.02-.04. The text of the proposed agreement was as follows:
WHEREAS, the contractor and the union desire to make an agreement apply-
ing in the event of subcontracting in accordance with Section 8(e) of the Labor
Management Relations Act;
WHEREAS, it is understood that by this agreement the contractor does not
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moved the case to the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Texas and Connell amended its pleadings, alleging that
the proposed agreement and picketing to obtain it not only violated
the antitrust laws of Texas, but also violated sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act3
 as an illegal restraint of trade.
After trial, the district court rendered judgment for defendant
Union, 4
 finding: the subcontractor agreement is authorized by the
construction industry proviso of section 8(e) of the National Labor
Relations Act; 5
 picketing to secure the agreement is not unlawful
since the agreement is so authorized; and, being authorized by
Congress, such an agreement does not violate federal antitrust laws.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit, affirming the lower court decision,
HELD: the Union did not lose its exemption from the antitrust laws
since no conspiracy to restrain trade between the Union and a
non-labor group had been shown6, and the agreement furthers
legitimate union interests in seeking to eliminate competition based
on differences in wage and labor standards.' The court refused to
decide whether the Union's picketing and the subcontractor agree-
ment were unfair labor practices on the ground that doing so would
usurp the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. 8
Further, the court stated that such a determination would be im-
material to the antitrust inquiry since "legitimate union interest" is
not controlled by the legality of the activity under the labor laws. 9
In a lengthy dissent, Judge Clark stated that the Union engaged in a
grant, nor does the union seek, recognition as the collective bargaining representa-
tive of any employees of the signatory contractor; and
WHEREAS, it is further understood that the subcontracting limitation provided
herein applies only to mechanical work which the contractor does not perform with
his own employees but uniformly subcontracts to other firms:
THEREFORE, the contractor and the union mutually agree with respect to
work falling within the scope of this agreement that is to be done at the site of the
construction, alteration, painting or repair of any building, structure or other works,
that if the contractor should contract or subcontract any of the aforesaid work falling
within the normal trade jurisdiction of the union, said contractor shall contract or
subcontract such work only to firms that are parties to an executed, current,
collective bargaining agreement with Local Union 100 of the United Association of
Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry.
483 F.2d at 1156-57 n.1, 84 L.R.R.M. at 2002 n.1.
3
 Section 1 provides: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal. . ." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
Section 2 provides: "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor . . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
4
 78 L.R.R.M. 3012 (N.D. Tex. 1971).
5
 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970).
6
 483 F.2d at 1165, 84 L.R.R.M. at 2008.
7 Id. at 1167, 84 L.R.R.M. at 2010.
8
 Id. at 1169, 84 L.R.R.M. at 2012.
9
 Id.
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secondary boycott and that this violation of the labor laws resulted
in a restraint of trade constituting a violation of the Sherman Act.°
The continuing clash between the antitrust laws, designed to
preserve a competitive business economy, and the labor laws, which
serve to foster union organization and collective bargaining to better
labor conditions and to promote industrial peace, has generated
legislative and judicial attempts to accommodate these conflicting
national policies. The present case, in its attempt to interpret labor's
exemption from the antitrust laws, serves to illustrate that the courts
and Congress have done little to establish cohesive and clear ap-
proaches to accommodate or reconcile the conflict. In the Connell
case, the Fifth Circuit has attempted to resolve some of the am-
biguities created by prior judicial determinations regarding the an-
titrust liability of labor unions and to effectuate congressional intent
in regard to the balance of interest between labor and management.
More specifically, the court has interpreted two Supreme Court
decisions, Meat Cutters Local 189 v. Jewel Tea" and American
Fed'n of Musicians v. Carroll, 12 as permitting an antitrust inquiry
even in the absence of a viable claim of conspiracy. This note will
examine the history of the application of the antitrust laws to union
activity, the ambiguities resulting from the Supreme Court's reex-
amination of the labor-antitrust issue in the last ten years, and the
implications of the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the current state
of the law in this area.
In the early years after passage of the Sherman Act, the anti-
trust laws were broadly applied to union activity under rulings that
condemned virtually every collective activity of labor as an unlawful
restraint of trade. 13 Indeed, more actions were instituted against
labor than against capital combinations." The congressional re-
sponse was the enactment in 1914 of sections 6 and 20 of the
Clayton Act," designed to protect labor unions from antitrust liabil-
u" Id. at 1179, 84 . L. R.R.M. at 2020 (dissenting opinion).
11 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
' 2 391 U.S. 99 (1968).
13 See Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908). For extensive analyses of labor's liability
under the antitrust laws before 1940, see Barnes, Unions and the Antitrust Laws, 7 Lab. L.J.
133 (1956); Berman, Labor and the Sherman Act (1930); Cox, Labor and the Antitrust
Laws--A Preliminary Analysis, 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 252 (1955); Winter, Collective Bargaining
and Competition: The Application of Antitrust Standards to Union Activities, 73 Yale L.J. 14
(1963).
14 Sec Winter, supra note 13, at 31.
IS Section 6 provides:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing
contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and
operation of labor ... organizations . . . or to forbid or restrain individual members
of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor
shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be construed to be illegal combina-
tions or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.
15 U.S.C, § 17 (1970). Section 20 provides:
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ity by specifically excluding labor as an article of commerce and
drastically limiting the injunction power of federal courts in labor
disputes. The impact of this labor charter of antitrust immunity was
severely restricted by the Supreme Court's 1921 decision in Duplex
Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 16 which narrowly interpreted sections
6 and 20 of the Clayton Act as protecting only the existence and
lawful activities of union organizations and preventing application of
the antitrust laws only to a labor dispute between employees and
their immediate employer. In Duplex, the Court found union use of
secondary boycotts and sympathetic strikes outside the purview of
these sections and thus not immunized from the antitrust laws. .
In 1932, Congress clarified the policy which had been expressed
in the Clayton Act, but had been frustrated by the courts in cases
such as Duplex, through enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 17
This Act, striking directly at the Duplex decision, clearly limits the
equity jurisdiction of federal courts in cases involving or growing
out of labor disputes, whether or not between employees and their
immediate employer," and defines a public policy designed to pro-
That no restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of the
United States, or a judge or the judges thereof, in any case between an employer and
"employees, or between employers and employees, or between employees, or between
persons employed and persons seeking employment, involving, or growing out of, a
dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment, unless necessary to prevent
irreparable injury to property, or to a property right, of the party making the
application, for which injury there is no adequate remedy at law . . . .
And no such restraining order or injunction shall prohibit any person or per-
sons, whether singly or in concert, from terminating any relation of employment, or
from ceasing to perform any work or labor, or from recommending, advising, or
persuading others by peaceful means so to do; or from attending at any place where
such person or persons may lawfully be, for the purpose of peacefully obtaining or
communicating information, or from peacefully persuading any person to work or to
abstain from working; or from ceasing to patronize or to employ any party to such a
dispute, or from recommending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful and
lawful means so to do; or from paying or giving to, or withholding from, any person
engaged in such dispute, any strike benefits or other moneys or things of value; or
from peaceably assembling in a lawful manner, and for lawful purposes; or from
doing any act or thing which might lawfully be done in the absence of such dispute
by any party thereto; or shall any of the acts specified in this paragraph be con-
sidered or held to be violations of any law of the United States.
29 U.S.C. § 52 (1970).
16 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
17 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1970).
The purpose of the bill is to protect the rights of labor in the same manner Congress
intended when it enacted the Clayton Act, October 15, 1914 (38 Stat. L., 738), which
act, by reason of its construction and application by the Federal courts, is ineffectual
to accomplish the congressional intent.
H.R. Rep. No, 669, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1932).
" The term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions
of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions
of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of employer and employee.
29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1970).
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mote collective bargaining.' 9
 Three years later, in the Wagner
Act, 2 ° Congress created substantive rights for employees and estab-
lished the National Labor Relations : Board to handle labor manage-
ment disputes, again emphasizing its intent to limit judicial in-
volvement in labor policy. 21
The first major case involving antitrust allegations against labor
union activity following enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was
the 1940 case of Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader. 22 The union had seized
and occupied the company's plant in an attempt to obtain a closed-
shop agreement, causing substantial damage to plant property and
preventing orders from being filled from plant inventory. 23 The
Supreme Court held that restraints of trade are not proscribed by
the Sherman Act unless union activity is directed at control of the
market with the intent to restrain commercial competition. 24 Al-
though Apex did not expressly apply the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the
Court recognized that elimination of price competition based on
differences in labor standards is the objective of any national labor
organization. The Court stated that such restraint on labor market
competition does not result in the kind of curtailment of price
competition prohibited by the Sherman Act. 25 Thus, Apex seems to
have foreshadowed substantial union emancipation from the Sher-
man Act, but did not clearly articulate an exemption since antitrust
liability still attached to union activities that intentionally affected or
restrained commercial competition. 26
One year after Apex, the Supreme Court in United States v.
Hutcheson27
 expressly recognized and applied the Norris-LaGuardia
Act and congressional intent to reestablish the broad labor union
exemption from antitrust initially established by the Clayton Act.
The Hutcheson case arose out of a work-jurisdiction dispute be-
tween rival unions in which one union engaged in primary and
secondary activities, directing strike activities against the employer's
product as well as against the employer and independent contractors
who were working on the employer's property. 28 Reading the Sher-
man Act together with the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, the Court reasoned that, since the union's conduct could not be
enjoined under these Acts, it was also immune from antitrust
19 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1970).
20
 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-68 (1970).
21
 See Keyserling, The Wagner Act; Its Origin and Current Significance, 29 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 199 (1960).
22 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
23 Id. at 482.
24
 Id. at 513.
25
 Id. at 504.
26 See Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining, and the Antitrust Laws, 32 U. Chi,
L. Rev. 659 (1965).
27 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
28 Id. at 227-28.
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attack. 29
 The Court described labor's qualified exemption from the
antitrust laws in terms that clearly prohibited the inferVeritfon - of
any judicial notions of the proper balance in the industrial struggle:
So long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not
combine with non-labor groups, the licit and the illicit
under section 20 [of the Clayton Act] are not to be disting-
uished by any judgment regarding the wisdom or unwis-
dom, the rightness or wrongness, the selfishness or
unselfishness of the end of which the particular union
activities are the means. 3 °
In 1945, the Supreme Court gave content to the Hutcheson
exception concerning combination with non-labor groups in Allen
Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW. 3 ' The union in this case had ob-
tained closed-shop collective bargaining agreements from local elec-
trical contractors and local manufacturers of electrical equipment.
The contractors agreed to buy only from manufacturers having
current collective bargaining agreements with the union and the
manufacturers agreed to sell only to contractors having current
collective bargaining agreements. 32 In this suit by manufacturers
who had been excluded from the market, the evidence showed that
the manufacturers, contractors and union jointly participated to fix
prices and that the union, through picketing and boycotts, provided
a sheltered market by excluding nonunion operations. The Court
recognized that the union's activities that contributed to the
combination's purpose fell squarely within the protection of the
Clayton Act and thus would have been immune from the Sherrhan
Act, despite resulting product market restraints, if the union had
acted alone. 33
 The Court stated that the immunity was lost when
unions combined with business groups to create business monopolies
and control the marketing of businesses and services. 34
For twenty years, neither Congress nor the Supreme Court
disturbed labor's antitrust exemption as formulated in Hutcheson
and Allen Bradley, and immunity was provided so long as a union
acted in its self-interest and did not combine with non-labor groups
to create monopolies or control markets." The Court in Hutcheson
29 Id. at 231.
3° Id. at 232.
3 ' 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
32
 Id. at 799-800.
" Id. at 807.
54
 Id. at 808. The Court stated that a union crosses the line of permitted union activities
when it participates in a business monopoly: "Our holding means that the same labor union
activities may or may not be in violation of the Sherman Act, dependent upon whether the
union acts alone or in combination with business groups." Id. at 810.
35
 There were cases during this period involving labor's exemption from the antitrust
laws, but they reveal no significant departure from Allen Bradley. See Los Angeles Meat
Drivers Union. v. United States, 371 U.S. 94 (1962); United States v. Employing Plasterers
Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186 (1954); United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460
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defined the union's self-interest to correspond to the scope of a labor
dispute as provided in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, relating to terms
or conditions of employment. 36 The national labor policy became
one of fostering union organization and tolerating labor's use of
economic weapons without resort to antitrust prosecution, leaving
disputes to be handled by the National Labor Relations Board. 37
Labor abuses of this broad immunity were addressed by Congress
and resulted in the Taft-Hartley Act38 in 1947 and the
Landrum-Griffin Amendments 39 in 1959, prohibiting "unfair labor
practices" by unions." However, in 1965, two Supreme Court cases
produced more confusion than clarity in the application of the rule
of exemption formulated in Hutcheson and Allen Bradley: UMW v.
Pennington 4 I and Meat Cutters Local .189 v. Jewel Tea. 42
In Pennington, the labor-antitrust issue was initially raised by a
small independent coal producer, alleging that the union and the
larger coal companies had concluded a wage agreement that would
establish production costs so high that small producers would be
driven from the market, leaving a monopolistic situation for the
large producers.'" The Court, in an opinion delivered by Justice
White," held that the union lost its antitrust exemption "when it
[was] clearly shown that it [had] agreed with one set of employers to
impose a certain wage scale on other bargaining units." 45 Thus,
Pennington is purportedly consistent with Allen Bradley in that the
Court found that a labor union loses its antitrust exemption when it
(1949); United Bhd. of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395 (1947); Hunt v. Crumboch,
325 U.S. 821 (1945).
36 See note 18 supra.
, 37 See Ratner, The Emergent Role of District Courts in National Labor Policy, 17 Lab.
L.J. 36 (1966).
38 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1970).
29 29 U.S.C. §§ 153-87 (1970).
4° For a discussion of congressional purpose, see National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v.
NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 623 (1967).
41 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
42 381 U.S. 676 (1965). For comments on the Pennington and Jewel Tea decisions, see
Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws: Pennington and Jewel Tea, 46 B.U.L. Rev. 317 (1966);
DiCola, Labor Antitrust: Pennington, Jewel Tea and Subsequent Meandering, 33 U. Pitt. L.
Rev. 705 (1972); Feller Anker, Analysis of Impact of Supreme Court's Antitrust Holdings,
59 L.R.R.M. 103 (1965); Zimmer & Silberman, Pennington and Jewel Tea: Antitrust Impact
on Collective Bargaining, 11 Antitrust Bull. 857 (1966); Comment, Labor's Antitrust Exemp-
tion After Pennington and Jewel Tea, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 742 (1966); Note, Labor-Antitrust:
Collective Bargaining and the Competitive Economy, 20 Stan. L. Rev. 684 (1968); Note, 7
B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 158 (1965).
43 381 U.S. at 659-61.
" Three groups, composed of three justices each, produced five separate opinions in
Pennington and Jewel Tea. Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice
Brennan, delivered the opinion of the Court in Pennington and announced the judgment of
the Court in Jewel Tea. Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Black and Clark, concurred in
Pennington and dissented in Jewel Tea. In a single opinion,. Justice Goldberg, joined by
Justices Harlan and Stewart, dissented from the opinion but concurred in the reversal of
Pennington and concurred in the judgment of Jewel Tea.
45 381 U.S. at 665.
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combines with a group of employers in a conspiracy to eliminate
competitors from the market. However, the Court in Pennington
further limited labor's exemption by facilitating the implication of a
union-employer conspiracy to control the market through an exami-
nation of the effects of a union-employer agreement on the market
and judicial balancing of the union interests involved. Justice White
pointed out that unions may unilaterally pursue uniform wage
agreements from other employers in the industry, but an agreement
with one employer to do so would be contrary to the union's in-
terests as well as the antitrust laws. 46
 Justice White reasoned that
the duty to bargain unit by unit is more in a union's interests than
an agreement with one employer to seek a uniform wage. 47 Speak-
ing of such a uniform wage agreement, Justice White found that "bit
is just such restraints upon the freedom of economic units to act
according to their own choice and discretion that run counter to
antitrust policy."'"
Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion in Pennington,"
suggested that on remand the jury should be instructed that if there
were an industry-wide collective bargaining agreement whereby
employers and the union agreed on a wage scale that exceeded the
financial ability of some operators to pay and if it was made for the
purpose of forcing some employers out of business, the union should
be found to have violated the Sherman Act. Justice Douglas further
suggested that an industry-wide agreement containing those features
is prima facie evidence of a violation. 5 °
In Jewel Tea, the companion case to Pennington, the union had
obtained a collective bargaining agreement with a multi-employer
bargaining unit representing retail meat dealers in the Chicago area,
which agreement contained a provision restricting the sale of fresh
meat to the hours between nine a.m. and six p.m. 5 ' Jewel Tea
signed the agreement under threat of strike and brought suit alleging
that the operating hours provision unduly restricted competition
because it prevented self-service stores from retailing prepackaged
meat after six p.m. Although there is no majority opinion in Jewel
Tea, 52
 a majority of the Court did find that the union did not lose its
exemption from the Sherman Act. 53 '
In his opinion in Jewel Tea, Justice White again focused his
inquiry on the union interest involved. 54 Unlike in Pennington,
46
 Id. at 666,
'' Id.
45
 Id. at 668.
" See note 44 supra..
5° 381 U.S. at 672-73 (concurring opinion). On remand, the district court held that the
evidence was not sufficient to prove a conspiracy. Pennington v. UMW, 257 F. Supp. 815
(E.D. Tenn. 1966).
51 381 U.S. at 679-80.
52 See note 44 supra.
53 381 U.S. at 684.
54 See id. at 689.
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however, in Jewel Tea there was no viable claim of a union-em-
ployer conspiracy. 55 Therefore, the sole inquiry made by Justice
White was whether the union's interest in the operating hours re-
striction justified the resulting anticompetitive effect on the product
market:
Thus the issue in this case is whether the marketing
hours restriction, like wages, and unlike prices, is so inti-
mately related to wages, hours, and working conditions
that the union's successful attempt to obtain that provision
through bona fide, arm's-length bargaining in pursuit of
their own labor union policies, and not at the behest of or
in combination with nonlabor groups, falls within the pro-
tection of the national labor policy and is therefore exempt
from the Sherman Act. 56
If this "intimately related" test shows that the labor exemption has
been lost, the existence of a substantive violation of the Sherman
Act would then turn "on whether the elements of a conspiracy in
restraint of trade or an attempt to monopolize had been proved."57
In balancing the relative impact of the operating hours restriction on
the product market against the interests of union members, Justice
White found the restrictive provision "intimately related" to the
union's concern with working hours and therefore exempt from
Sherman Act liability."
Justice Goldberg, while concurring with the result reached by
Justice White in Jewel Tea and concurring in the reversal of
Pennington, 59 suggested a different test: antitrust immunity for col-
lective bargaining activity concerning "mandatory subjects of bar-
gaining" under the labor statutes." Otherwise, in Justice Goldberg's
opinion, the "intimately related" test of Justice White would allow
antitrust liability in the area of collective bargaining to be governed
by judicial notions of the social and economic desirability of union
action. 61
55 Id. at 688.
36 Id. at 689-90 (emphasis added). Justice White states: "The crucial determinant is not
the form of the agreement—e.g., prices or wages—but its relative impact on the product
market and the interests of union members." Id. at 690 n.5.
57 Id. at 693.
58 Id. at 691.
39 See note 44 supra.
6°
 381 U.S. at 710. Mandatory subjects of bargaining are those relating to wages, hours
and other terms and conditions of employment, NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner
Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958). See Section of Labor Relations Law, American Bar Ass'n,
The Developing Labor Law 379-439 (C. Morris ed. 1971).
°I Justice White's "intimately related" test also has been criticized as inherently ambigu-
ous. One commentator observes:
Does the intimate relation involve a balancing of product market restraint against
labor interest? Or must one intimately relate first and balance later? If immunity is
dependent upon such a balancing at any point in the analysis, it must be noted that
the fulcrum will be the economic prejudices of the judicial fact-finder.
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In his dissent in Jewel Tea, Justice Douglas found that the
collective bargaining agreement itself is evidence of a conspiracy
among the employers with the unions to impose the operating hours
restriction on competitors. 62 Justice Douglas interpreted Allen Brad-
ley as condemning this type of product market restraint. 63 Yet, the
Court in Allen Bradley specifically stated that the collective bargain-
ing agreement was but one element in a far larger program in which
unions and non-labor groups united to fix prices and allocate
markets, 64
Starting from the broad immunity of labor unions recognized in
Allen Bradley in 1945, with its exception of union combination with
non-labor groups to fix prices and allocate markets, the Supreme
Court in Pennington and Jewel Tea has almost allowed the excep-
tion to swallow the rule. The exception in Allen Bradley focused on
the use by business groups of labor unions as a shield to allow
employers to achieve ends proscribed by the Sherman Act. 65 In
Pennington and Jewel Tea, however, the Court focused on balanc-
ing the union interests involved in certain collective bargaining
agreement provisions with their effect on the product market, infer-
ring an Allen Bradley-type conspiracy in Pennington and attempting
to redefine the scope of labor's immunity even without a conspiracy
in Jewel Tea. This balancing act would seem to return the status of
labor's exemption to the days of the Duplex case, during which
judicial notions of the proper balance in.the industrial struggle were
determinative of labor's antitrust liability. This practice was con-
demned in Hutcheson, 66 wherein the Court found that Congress had
defined labor union interests and thereby excluded any substitution
of judicial policy judgments concerning union purposes. One group
of judges in Pennington and Jewel Tea even found a collective
bargaining agreement that resulted in product market restraints to
be prima facie evidence of a conspiracy in violation of the Sherman
Act. 67 Further, the Court's inability to agree on a single test for
balancing union interests against product market restraints provides
little guidance for lower courts faced with antitrust allegations
against labor union activity.
DiCola, supra note 41, at 721. Another commentator finds no less than four possible interpre-
tations of the test. See Comment, supra note 42, at 757-58.
(' 2 381 U.S. at 736 (dissenting opinion). Note that this corresponds to his jury instructions
in Pennington. See text at note 50 supra.
°I Unless Allen Bradley is either overruled or greatly impaired, the unions can no
more aid a group of businessmen to force their competitors to follow uniform store
marketing hours than to force them to sell at fixed prices. Both practices take away
the freedom of traders to carry on their business in their own competitive fashion.
Id. at 737 (dissenting opinion).
6  See 325 U.S. at 809.
65 Id. at 809-10. See Note, 7 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 158, 160-61 (1965).
66 See text at note 30 supra.
" See text at note 50 supra.
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In two cases since 1965, the Supreme Court has again faced the
labor-antitrust issue without providing any greater clarity. In Ram-
sey v. UMW," the Court was asked to determine what standard of
proof must be met in order to establish a union-employer conspir-
acy. In this antitrust suit, small coal mine operators sought to show
an express or implied agreement between the union and a multi-em-
ployer group to impose a certain wage scale on all coal mine
operators, with the knowledge that the smaller- operators would be
driven out of the market. 69 The district court had required "clear
proof" that the alleged acts had occurred, that the acts had revealed
a conspiracy, and that they had caused harm to the small coal mine
operators." The Supreme Court, clarifying its holding in Penning-
ton that "a union forfeits its exemption from the antitrust laws when
it is clearly shown that it has agreed with one set of employers to
impose a certain wage scale on other bargaining units," 71 ruled that
in antitrust actions against labor unions the standard of proof re-
quired to establish the occurrence of illegal acts or to determine that
the acts constitute a conspiracy is the usual preponderance of the
evidence standard. 72 Although the district court's "clear proof'
standard would have restored labor's exemption under the Allen
Bradley rule, 73 the Court in Ramsey chose to continue the vague
standard of Pennington that "some evidence" which creates an
inference of conspiracy is sufficient.' 4
Although the evidentiary question concerning a union-employer
conspiracy raised by Pennington was answered in Ramsey," the
Supreme Court in American Fecrn of Musicians v. Carroll 76 failed to
make a choice between the "intimately related" test" and the "man-
datory subject of bargaining" test's of labor's exemption from the
Sherman Act when there is no conspiracy alleged. In Carroll, the
union had a virtual closed shop in New York City by means of
agreements with hotels, booking agents and record companies, reg-
ulating musicians' employment through the union bylaws. 79 The
bylaws required each member orchestra leader to follow a minimum
price scale and to use certain booking agents. The antitrust suit was
brought by orchestra leaders against the union." The Supreme
68 401 U.S. 302 (1971).
69 Id. at 304.
7° Id. at 307.
" 381 U.S. at 665.
72 401 U.S. at 309.
73 See Note, 13 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 383, 392 (1971).
74 See id. at 389-90,
73 See id. at 390.
76
 391 U.S. 99 (1968).
77 See text at note 56 supra.
76 See text at note 60 supra.
79 391 U.S. at 102-04.
8° Id. at 102.
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Court held that the orchestra leaders constituted a "labor group"
and thus there was no combination with a non-labor group." The
Court also held that the fixing of price scales was a "legitimate union
interest" because the price floors actually operated to protect the
wages of other union members. 82 In reaching its determination, the
Court emphasized Justice White's statement in Jewel Tea that
the crucial determinant of antitrust liability is not the form of the
agreement but its impact on the product market and the interests of
union members. 83 However, Justice White's "intimately related" test
seems stretched almost beyond recognition in Carroll. Indeed, Jus-
tice White himself dissented in Carroll, finding that the balance in
favor of price competition outweighed the union interest in wage
scale. 84 Although the Court stated that it was expressing no opinion
on whether all union activities concerning subjects of mandatory
bargaining are exempt from the Sherman Act, 85 as suggested by
Justice Goldberg in Jewel Tea, it certainly seemed to be implying
such a result. However, to find such a holding by implication may
prove unwarranted, for it has been suggested that the holding in
Carroll may be limited to the special employment conditions of the
music industry or to industries in which the cost of the product is
little more than the total wage bill. 86
From these renewed pronouncements by the Supreme Court in
Pennington, Jewel Tea, Ramsey and Carroll, the lower federal
courts must discern the scope of labor's antitrust exemption and the
appropriate test to apply to determine if union activities fall within
the exemption. It is such a situation that faced the Fifth Circuit in
Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers Local 100.
In Connell, the antitrust allegations were based on grounds
similar to the "mandatory subject of bargaining" test proposed by
Justice Goldberg in Jewel Tea. Connell sought to distinguish its
situation from a "primary subcontractor agreement" contained in a
collective bargaining agreement, which would be a mandatory bar-
gaining subject and legal under the National Labor Relations Act in
the construction industry." Connell stated that a "secondary sub-
contractor agreement," as in this case, is one between a union and
an employer who has no employees who are members of that union
and thus is not a mandatory bargaining subject. 8. 8 Connell argued
°I Id. at 107.
82 Id. at 109.
83 Id. at 107, citing Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 690 n.5.
" Id. at 119 (dissenting opinion).
55 Id. at 110.
" See Note, 10 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 480 (1969); DiCola, supra note 42.
°7 ' 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970); see Centlivre Village Apts., 148 N.L.R.B. No. 93, 57
L.R.R.M. 1081 (1964).
88 Brief for Appellant at 14, Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 483 F.2d 1154,
84 L.R.R.M. 2001 (5th Cir. 1973).
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that since the construction industry proviso of section 8(e) of the
National Labor Relations Act reached only primary subcontractor
agreements, the legality of secondary subcontractor agreements
should be determined by reference to national economic policies as
embodied in the Sherman Act." Under the Sherman Act, the second-
ary subcontractor agreement at issue would result in an illegal
restraint of trade by forcing non-unionized contractors out of the
Dallas area construction market.
The Fifth Circuit, after analyzing the history of labor's exemp-
tion from the antitrust laws, found a two-fold test for determining a
union's antitrust exemption emerging "from the thicket of Jewel
Tea": 9° (1) if a conspiracy between labor and non-labor groups to
injure the business of another non-labor group is alleged and
proven, the exemption is not available; (2) if no conspiracy is al-
leged, there is no exemption if the agreement does not encompass a
"legitimate union interest."" After finding that Connell had made
out no sufficient claim of conspiracy to create a monopoly for a
non-labor group, the court turned to the second step of analysis to
determine whether there was a "legitimate union interest."
Basing its inquiry into "legitimate union interest" on the Jewel
Tea and Carroll cases, the court appears to have adopted Justice
White's "intimately related" test in determining what constitutes a
legitimate union interest. 92 The court recognized that the subcon-
tractor agreement was sought by the Union to help organize other
subcontractors, 93 a difficult task in the construction industry due to
its ambulatory nature and the lack of continuity between the various
parties on a construction project." Concluding that the agreement
was "directly related to work attainment, work preservation, and
other labor standards which directly benefit the members of the
union involved," 95 the court found the agreement in Connell even
more directly related to union benefit than the agreements in Jewel
Tea and Carroll. Balancing these direct union benefits against the
S9 Reply Brief for Appellant at 13, Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 483 F.2d
1154, 84 L. R. R.M. 2001 (5th Cir. 1973).
90 483 F.2d at 1166, 84 L.R.R.M. at 2009.
92 Id. at 1164, 1166, 84 L.R.R.M.•at 2008, 2009.
93 The approach thus selected by the Fifth Circuit substantiates a thesis of this note that
the Supreme Court has not provided a cohesive guideline for lower courts to follow in this
area, as the Fifth Circuit's choice of Justice White's test is a break in the trend described by
DiCola, supra note 42, at 753: "Jewel Tea-type cases of 1965-72 vintage indicate little
adherence to Justice White's 'intimately related' test in the lower courts. Justice Goldberg's
view in Jewel Tea seems to have gained acceptance, if only by default." See text at note 105
infra.
93 483 F.2d at 1167, 84 L. R.R.M. at 2010.
94 Id. at 1168, 84 L.R.R.M. at 2011. For an excellent analysis of the unique labor
situation in the construction industry, see Comment, The Impact of the Taft-Hartley Act on
the Building and Construction Industry, 60 Yale L.J. 673 (1951).
95 483 F.2d at 1168, 84 L,R.R.M. at 2011.
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anticompetitive effects of the agreement on the product market, the
court found the balance in favor of the Union. 96
The Connell court appears to reject the "mandatory subject of
bargaining" test suggested by Justice Goldberg in Jewel Tea and the
analysis offered by Connell in its brief. 97
 Finding that the legality
under the labor laws of the subcontractor agreement had not been
determined by the National Labor Relations Board, the court stated
that labor law legality, and impliedly the mandatory/non-mandatory
subject distinction,- is irrelevant when it is not material to an anti-
trust suit." The labor.laws themselves provide sanctions for certain
objectionable practices; further, activities not specifically covered by
the labor laws may have been left intentionally unregulated by
Congress. 99
 The Fifth Circuit therefore seems to have left the bal-
ance of interest between labor and management up to Congress,
allowing antitrust inquiry by the courts regarding this balance only
when the terms of the agreement a union seeks are not designed to
"benefit its members in the hours, conditions, and other immediately
relevant concerns of the working man."'°°
In his dissent in Connell, Judge Clark interpreted Jewel Tea
and post-Hutcheson congressional action to signify that a union loses
its antitrust exemption when it engages in an unfair labor practice
that results in product market restraint.' 01 Judge Clark concluded
that secondary boycotts should be included with price-fixing and
market allocation as a classic antitrust problem. 102
In its attempt to discern the scope of labor's exemption from the
Sherman Act, the Fifth Circuit has attempted to interpret Jewel Tea
and Carroll, in which antitrust inquiries-were permitted with respect
to unilateral union activity, as consistent with the principle of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act and Allen Bradley that elimination of com-
petition based on differences in wages and labor standards is not the
type of anticompetitive result that is condemned by the Sherman
Act. Although the result reached may have been appropriate in this
case, the Connell case illustrates the problem the lower courts have
in attempting to follow the Supreme Court's multifarious attempts to
define labor's antitrust liability. It is submitted that Congress must
act to clarify labor's exemption from the antitrust laws and to
balance the judicially irreconcilable policies of labor and antitrust
law.
96
 Id. at 1168-69, 84 L.R.R.M. at 2011.
97 See text at notes 87-89 supra.
OR 483 F.2d at 1169, 84 L.R.R.M. at 2012. The Court finds that it has no jurisdiction to
decide the legality of the agreement under the labor laws since that issue would be within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Nation& Labor Relations Board.
99 Id. at 1170, 84 L.R.R.M. at 2013.
'" Id.
1 ° 1 Id. at 1178, 84 L.R.R.M. at 2019 (dissenting opinion).
102
 Id., 84 L.R.R.M. at 2020 (dissenting opinion).
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Antitrust inquiry into unilateral union activity was originally
directed at labor's use of certain economic weapons such as second-
ary boycotts)" Under the congressional mandate of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, the Supreme Court recognized that the rightness or
wrongness of union methods for achieving labor goals was not to be
susceptible to judicial inquiry and treble damages under the Sher-
man Act)" Presently, many of the condemned activities of earlier
antitrust cases are now prohibited by the labor laws.
With the protective legislation of Congress and the establish-
ment of the administrative tribunal of the National Labor Relations
Board, union organization has been fostered with the resulting
growth of union power. In Pennington and Jewel Tea, the Supreme
Court appears to have been responding to this greatly increased
power of labor and to unions' use of this power in collective bargain-
ing efforts with multi-employer groups at an industry-wide level.
If the balance of power between labor and management needs
readjusting in the public interest in light of the success of the labor
movement, the adjustment should be made by Congress, not the
courts. Judicial inquiry into unilateral union activity returns the
labor-antitrust issue to the pre-Norris-LaGuardia era when courts
were free to substitute their own views as to the union's interests for
the views of the union's officers and members. Further, the courts
are unable to agree on what test should be applied to determine
labor's antitrust liability. Since union goals ultimately can be
achieved only through collective bargaining agreements, the courts
will always be able to find a combination with a non-labor group.
Without legislative guidance, the lower courts must choose
which blend of Jewel Tea to follow. Under Justice White's "inti-
mately related" test, the courts cannot avoid injecting judicial no-
. tions of the rightness and wrongness of union ends, for they must
determine if union interests are strong enough to outweigh any
resulting product market restraints. As the Fifth Circuit in Connell
implicitly demonstrated, the balance reached may depend on special
employment conditions in certain industries, such as the construc-
tion industry. On the other hand, the "mandatory subject of bar-
gaining" test proposed by Justice Goldberg in Jewel Tea may not
always provide the relevant inquiry.'" The National Labor Rela-
tions Board determines what is a mandatory bargaining subject in
the context of charges of unfair labor practices for refusal to bargain
in good faith, not in consideration of the anticompetitive effect of
completed collective bargaining agreements. If this test had been
applied in the Connell case, the union would not have been exempt
I " See, e.g., Duplex Printing Press Co. v, Deering, 254 U.S. 433 (1921).
I" See text at note 30 supra.
1 " Sec note 92 supra.
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from the Sherman Act since a mandatory bargaining subject was not
involved.
It thus appears that, as in the situation following the Duplex
decision, Congress must act to resolve some of the judicially-created
ambiguities regarding labor's exemption from the Sherman Act. If
the courts persist in finding the Sherman Act to be applicable to
union efforts to achieve, maintain or exploit its monopoly in the
labor market for union ends, it is suggested that Congress should
clearly state whether violations of the labor laws should ever give
rise to antitrust liability.
DONNA M. SHERRY
Patents—Allocation of Territories—Restrictions on Sublicensees
—Per Se Violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act—American
Industrial Fastener Corp. v. Flushing Enterprises, lnc.'—A suit for
breach of contract was brought by the plaintiffs, American Indus-
trial Fastener Corporation (American) and its secretary-treasurer
Arthur Herpolsheimer. 2 The defendants, Flushing Enterprises, Inc.
(Flushing) and specified individuals, counterclaimed that the agree-
ment sued upon was void and unenforceable because it contained
restrictions constituting per se violations of the Sherman Act, 3 and
on these grounds moved for summary judgment.
The contract sued upon established a pyramidal relationship
ranging from licensors to subdistributors. At the top of the pyramid,
as licensors, were both Herpolsheimer and American. The original
patent was obtained by Herpolsheimer, who transferred to Ameri-
can the exclusive rights of sale throughout the world. 4 One level
below the licensors was Flushing, who, as licensee, obtained, from
the plaintiffs the exclusive manufacturing and sales rights of the
patented device within a fourteen state territory. Pursuant to the
minimum requirements, the licensee (Flushing) was to establish
distributors subject to approval by the licensor (American); the
distributors in turn were to set up subdistributors. The distributors
were permitted to manufacture and sell the patented device, pro-
vided they agreed to be bound by the territorial restrictions imposed
1 362 F. Supp. 32 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
2 The statement of facts is based on that set out in 362 F. Supp. at 33-35,
3 15 U.S.C, §§ 1, 2 . (1970).
• For a discussion of the assignability of patents generally, see Deller's Walker on Patents
§§ 335 et seq. (2d ed. 1965). The major distinction between an assignment and a license is that
"an assignment endows the assignee with the right to sue for infringement, while a license
merely provides the licensee with immunity from suits for infringement." Id. § 343, at 377.
See also R. Ellis, Patent Assignments §§ 49 et seq. (3d ed. 1955); R. Ellis, Patent Assignments
and Licenses §§ 54 et seq. (2d ed. 1943).
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